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this restriction of so-called controlled foreign company (CFC) rules and the related 
emergence of IP boxes cast doubt on the positive effects the ECJ is assumed to have. 
Additionally, we show that the abolishment of IP boxes would strengthen tax neutrality 
in Europe. Overall, further research is needed to relate and harmonise economic and 
legal concepts of tax neutrality.  
 
 
 
JEL Classification Code: H21, K10 
Keywords: European Court of Justice, Tax Neutrality, Effective Tax Rates, Controlled 
Foreign Company Rules, Intellectual Property Boxes 
 
Acknowledgement: The authors gratefully acknowledge support from the MannheimTaxation (MaTax) 
Science Campus, funded by the Leibniz Association, the State of Baden-Württemberg, and the participating 
institutions ZEW and University of Mannheim.  
Corresponding authors: Rainer Bräutigam and Frank Streif, ZEW Mannheim, L 7, 1, 68161 Mannheim, 
Germany, ++49-621-1235-163, rainer.braeutigam@zew.de and streif@zew.de
1 
1. Introduction 
The long-term goal of the European Union (EU) is to establish and ensure an internal 
market.1 The completion of this “area without internal frontiers”2 should be encouraged 
by a consistent economic policy in each member state favouring “an efficient allocation 
of resources”3 in the European Union. This goal which is derived from economic theory 
calls for a neutral tax system that does not distort investment decisions.4 However, the 
differences in tax systems in the EU are still substantial as direct taxation remains the 
sole responsibility of the member states and efforts for more harmonisation initiated by 
the European Commission have had only little success.5 This creates significant 
economic distortions until today.6  
Consequently, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is an influential player in completing 
the internal market and has a high impact on tax policy in Europe. The court’s decisions 
focus especially on the elimination of discriminatory measures of cross-border 
investments compared to domestic investments.7 Some of the decisions had a major 
impact on tax systems in Europe and several member states had to adapt their national 
laws after the judgements. The reasoning of the ECJ decisions have been discussed and 
criticized in legal literature at length.8 Most papers argue that the ECJ’s jurisprudence 
lacks clear guidance for the member states when it comes to defining what exactly EU-
law compliant tax policy is.  
In contrast to lengthy debates in legal literature, possible effects of ECJ’s jurisprudence 
have only scarcely been discussed in economic literature. Some papers evaluate if the 
ECJ rather favours capital export or capital import neutrality.9 The only systematic 
analysis concerning possible effects of the ECJ’s jurisprudence on tax neutrality is 
1 Article 26 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). This goal has already been 
established in the Treaty of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957. 
2 Article 26 (2) TFEU. 
3 Article 120 TFEU.  
4 See Horst (1980); Auerbach (1989); Mason (2010, p.126). 
5 One reason is the requirement for a unanimous decision of all member states. See Graetz/Warren (2006, 
pp. 1227-1232). 
6 See Devereux/Pearson (1995); European Commission (2001); Elschner/Vanboerren (2010). 
7 Until today, more than 250 cases concerning issues in direct taxation have been decided by the ECJ. See 
European Commission (2015). 
8 See p. ex. Lang (2002); Bizioli (2008); Pistone (2010). 
9 See Spengel (2003, pp. 256-262); Graetz/Warren (2006); Mason/Knoll (2012); Schön (2015). 
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provided by de la Feria/Fuest by means of a theoretical model.10 They show that 
depending on the reaction of the member states, economic distortions could actually 
increase due to the ECJ’s decisions.  
Given the important role of the ECJ and its impact on national tax systems, the 
consequences for economic distortions have not been sufficiently investigated yet. The 
essential research question at this interdisciplinary edge between economics and law is 
whether the ECJ’s jurisprudence actually contributes to the reduction of economic 
distortions caused by national tax systems in the member states or not.  
A landmark decision of the ECJ was the Cadbury-Schweppes ruling on CFC rules in 
2006.11 We use this decision to illustrate and quantify the economic effects of the ECJ’s 
jurisprudence. In this ruling, the court limited the applicability of CFC rules within the 
EU. The rules are targeted at specific (highly mobile) activities conducted in a foreign 
low-tax country and aim at effectively taxing such income on accrual at the higher home 
country tax rate. The ECJ declined the applicability of such rules within the EU when the 
application is solely based on the low level of taxation in the country of the foreign 
subsidiary. Instead, CFC rules are only compatible with EU law12 if they are restricted to 
“wholly artificial arrangements” that do not unfold any economic activity (e.g. letter 
boxes).13 All member states with CFC rules had to amend their legislation and limit the 
application to such “wholly artificial arrangements” as demanded by the ECJ.14 At its 
heart, the issue closely relates to the problem on how to examine the existence of 
economic substance of corporate structures and transactions; this legal and economic 
challenge is also reflected in the comprehensive litigation on tax shelters in the US that 
the Internal Revenue Service has deemed to be abusive.15 Consequently, CFC rules are of 
low relevance within the EU and the European Economic Area (EEA) nowadays.16 In this 
context, Ruf/Weichenrieder (2013) investigate whether the Cadbury-Schweppes decision 
in 2006 has led to an increasing use of low-tax regimes by German multinationals in 
10 See de la Feria/Fuest (2011). 
11 See European Court of Justice, Judgement from 12. September 2006. 
12 Especially with the fundamental freedoms provided by the TFEU.  
13 See European Court of Justice, Judgement from 12. September 2006, para. 57. 
14 See European Council (2010). 
15 See Borek et al. (2014). 
16 See Fontana (2006); Smit (2014). Due to special treaties with countries of the European Economic Area 
(EEA), the judgement also affected the tax policy in Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein. Therefore, these 
countries are included in our analysis. Generally, the objectives of the EEA agreement are basically the 
same as in the TFEU. See Gudmundsson (2006). 
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Europe.17 They find economically significant evidence that passive investments from 
German multinationals in low-tax EEA countries has increased due to the Cadbury-
Schweppes decision. Similarly, Altshuler/Hubbard and Ruf/Weichenrieder (2012) also 
confirm the economic relevance of CFC legislation for the decisions of multinationals 
that allocate passive assets.18 However, none of these studies discuss the general impact 
of CFC rules and the above mentioned Cadbury-Schweppes decision on tax neutrality in 
Europe.  
Notably, the highly restricted applicability of CFC rules has widened the possibility for 
member states to attract foreign investment by a favourable tax environment without 
triggering CFC rules of the corresponding parent country. Before the ruling, member 
states were restricted to offer favourable tax conditions for certain investments in their 
country as the application of CFC rules of another country could have eliminated the 
offered tax incentives. If the conditions of CFC thresholds were fulfilled, the effective tax 
burden was grossed-up to the higher tax level of the parent's country.19 Consequently, 
this restricted certain forms of tax competition within the EU before the Cadbury-
Schweppes decision which restrained member states from attracting foreign investment 
by means of very favourable tax conditions.  
We argue that the new possibilities for attracting foreign investments after the 
judgement have been promptly used by some countries. The rise of Intellectual Property 
box regimes (IP boxes) within the EU, which provide a lower effective tax rate to 
(specific) income from IP, can be seen as a direct consequence of the de-facto 
abolishment of CFC rules. This is especially true for IP boxes which include acquired IP 
in addition to self-developed IP.20  We argue that IP box regimes which include acquired 
IP would not have been introduced in the EU without the judgement since they would 
have not unfolded a significant effect due to CFC rules. The judgement and the reactions 
in the member states (adaptation of CFC rules and introduction of IP boxes) constitute 
an important case that allows us to analyse whether the ECJ contributes to the economic 
goal of an efficient allocation of resources by eliminating influences of tax systems or 
17 See Ruf/Weichenrieder (2013). 
18 See Altshuler/Hubbard (2003); Ruf/Weichenrieder (2012). 
19 Under CFC taxation, most countries tax the income of the foreign subsidiary according to their national 
rules as accrued and grant a tax credit for taxes paid in the foreign country. See Dahlberg/Wiman (2013, p. 
40); Endres/Spengel (2015, pp. 339-342). 
20 For a detailed overview see Evers et al. (2015). 
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not. With this analysis, we also take a combined view on two areas (CFC rules and IP 
boxes) that are highly debated in the current “Base Erosion and Profit Shifting” (BEPS) 
project of the OECD.21  
In our analysis, we apply the Devereux-Griffith model22 which allows us to make precise 
quantitative assessments on the consequences of the ECJ’s ruling for tax neutrality in 
Europe in the context of intellectual property. The analysis will be based on effective 
average tax rates (EATR) provided by the Devereux-Griffith model. We will investigate 
how the mean and standard deviation of the EATR for domestic and cross-border 
investments develop over time for different (counterfactual) scenarios (with/without 
CFC rule and with/without IP box regimes). The mean can be used to identify general 
trends concerning the absolute tax burden for investments whereas the standard 
deviation indicates whether there is a convergence or divergence of EATRs in the EU.23  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a detailed overview 
of CFC rules in the EU member states and how the Cadbury-Schweppes decision in 2006 
has impacted them. In addition, we show the main properties of the IP box regimes 
which have emerged in recent years. Section 3 presents the Devereux-Griffith model and 
the implementation of CFC rules into the model. Section 4 provides results for the 
different scenarios and discusses their implications. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
2. CFC Rules and IP Boxes in the EU Member States (2004-2014) 
In the following, we provide a detailed overview on the properties of CFC rules and IP 
boxes in the EU member states from 2004 to 2014 which serves to illustrate how CFC 
rules and IP boxes work and how they impact the tax burden of investments. 
2.1 CFC Rules 
2.1.1 Aim and properties of CFC rules in general 
Most countries use CFC rules as anti-avoidance measures against extensive use of low 
tax jurisdictions by multinational enterprises.24 Generally, the separation principle in 
21 See OECD (2013). 
See Devereux/Griffith (1999) and Schreiber et al. (2002).
23 This approach is also applied by Devereux/Pearson (1995); Ruiz (2006); Elschner et al. (2011). 
24 See Dahlberg/Wiman (2013, p. 21); Endres/Spengel (2015, pp. 339-342). However, in certain 
circumstances countries may have incentives to not apply CFC rules since they lower their multinationals’ 
competitiveness abroad. For the United States, see for example Brauner/Herzfeld (2013, p. 783). 
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international taxation enables multinationals to exploit tax differentials across 
jurisdictions.25 However, if CFC rules apply, profits of a foreign subsidiary are taxed as 
accrued at the higher tax rate of the parent’s home country.  
A common requirement for CFC rules to be applicable is that the parent company 
controls the foreign subsidiary. Most commonly, this is fulfilled if the parent owns 50% 
or more of the capital of the subsidiary. Otherwise, CFC rules mainly differ with respect 
to two dimensions. The first dimension is about the income which is subject to CFC rules. 
If the “entity approach” is used, all income that is generated by a foreign subsidiary is 
included whereas the “transactional” approach restricts the CFC rule’s applicability to 
specific kinds of income deemed to be passive (such as royalty or interest income).26  
The second dimension determines the exact definition of a low-tax jurisdiction. Two 
approaches prevail:27 If the “threshold approach” is used, a required minimum level of 
taxation is defined by the CFC legislation of the home country. The minimum 
requirement usually refers to the actual tax paid in a foreign country and is defined as 
the percentage of the tax burden which the same investment would bear at home. If the 
actual foreign tax burden is below the minimum requirement the CFC rule applies. In 
contrast, if the “jurisdictional approach” is used, governments publish official blacklists 
and/or whitelists that explicitly name countries for which CFC rules apply and/or do not 
apply. In general, CFC rules are not applicable for countries which are listed on a 
whitelist. The non-applicability holds for all income - active and passive. However, most 
countries which use whitelists additionally require a minimum level of taxation in the 
source country. 
If CFC rules of the parent’s country are triggered by the income of a subsidiary, the tax 
due is calculated according to the tax law of the parent’s country. A tax credit for the tax 
paid in the foreign country may be granted to avoid double taxation. 
2.1.2 Implications of the Cadbury-Schweppes decision 
In 2006, the ECJ had to decide on the compatibility of the British CFC rules with EU law. 
In the case at hand, a British multinational (Cadbury-Schweppes) had two subsidiaries 
in Ireland, one of them receiving substantial amounts of passive income. Before the ECJ’s 
25 See Graetz (2003, p. 217). 
26 See Dahlberg/Wiman (2013, p. 34); Endres/Spengel (2015, p. 340). 
27 See Dahlberg/Wiman (2013, pp. 36-38) 
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decision, the British CFC rule applied to the income of that Irish subsidiary due to the 
passive income and the fact that the tax paid in Ireland was below the minimum level 
required by the British CFC rule.28 The ECJ restricted the applicability of the minimum 
requirement to wholly artificial arrangements that do not reflect any economic activity, 
e.g. pure letter boxes.29 From the ECJ’s point of view, it was not proven that the Irish 
subsidiary was of wholly artificial nature. In this case, CFC rules cannot be justified and 
are an infringement to the freedom of establishment. Consequently, member states had 
to adapt their CFC rules as demanded by the ECJ.30  
2.1.3 Overview of CFC rules and reactions after the judgement 
Throughout the years from 2004 to 2014, CFC rules have been applied in ten EU 
member states and in Norway. In addition, Iceland and Greece have introduced CFC 
rules in 2009 and 2014, respectively.31  
Table 2.1 in the annex provides a detailed overview of the country-specific CFC rules. 
Nine countries apply a “threshold approach” to define a low-tax jurisdiction by setting 
out a minimum requirement for the level of taxation in the source countries. Three 
countries apply the “jurisdictional approach”; however, these countries also apply a 
minimum requirement as a subordinate condition.32 In the time period observed, two 
countries (Denmark and Italy) changed their approach for defining low-tax jurisdictions.  
Apart from the recently introduced CFC regime in Greece, all countries with a minimum 
requirement refer to the actual tax paid in the source country as the relevant tax 
measure. With regard to the “acceptable” low level of taxes in the source country, there 
is a wide variety with absolute and relative limits. These limits remain mostly constant 
over the observed time period. Some member states (e.g. Hungary, Finland, and 
Sweden) restrict their CFC rules to non-tax treaty countries which limits the 
applicability of CFC rules irrespective of the judgment. In case CFC rules apply, a relief 
for the foreign tax paid is available in nearly all countries. Hungary and Iceland have 
currently no relief mechanism in place whereas in Spain taxes paid abroad are only 
deductible. 
28 See European Court of Justice, Judgement from 12. September 2006, para. 13-18. 
29 See ibid., para. 49, 55. 
30 See Fontana (2006); Rust (2008). 
31 Poland has introduced CFC rules starting in 2015. 
32 Except for Italy until 2010 which switched to a “threshold approach” in the same year. 
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As a reaction to the Cadbury-Schweppes judgement in 2006, most member states added 
an exception clause for all EEA countries which restricts the applicability of CFC rules to 
“wholly artificial arrangements”.33 France and Spain actually limited the applicability of 
their CFC rules even before the judgement, as both anticipated the judgement of the ECJ. 
In fact, Spain completely abolished CFC rules within the EU in 2004 and reintroduced 
them in accordance with the judgement in 2008.34 By contrast, Denmark is the only 
member state that has extended its CFC rules to domestic income after the judgment. 
For the Danish CFC rule to apply, only the kind of income of the subsidiary is decisive, 
not the level of taxation.35 
2.2 IP Box Regimes  
Recently, IP box regimes have emerged within the EU. They offer reduced tax rates for 
income that can be attributed to intellectual property. After France (2000) and Hungary 
(2003), ten other European countries introduced IP box regimes before the end of 
2014.36 Some properties of IP box regimes are under on-going review by the EU 
commission as they might constitute a case of forbidden state aid. Also, the legitimacy of 
IP boxes is debated and questioned by the on-going OECD project on BEPS.37  
Evers et al. give a detailed overview of the properties of IP boxes in Europe and compute 
effective average tax rates (EATR) for self-developed patents by using the methodology 
of Devereux and Griffith.38 In our paper, we model the location choice for an IP holding 
company that acquires patents or licenses. Acquired IP is favoured by IP boxes in Cyprus, 
France, Hungary, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg and Malta.39 The IP boxes differ significantly 
with respect to the treatment of current expenses (e.g. depreciation). Hungary applies 
the “gross income approach” which means that expenses can be deducted at the normal 
tax rate whereas the corresponding income is only taxed at the reduced IP box rate. In 
contrast, the other countries apply the “net income approach” in which case expenses 
also have to be deducted at the IP rate. In all six countries, the IP box rates are at least 
33 This was proposed by the European Council (2010). 
34 See Baez/Zornoza (2013, p. 701). 
35 Up to now, it is unclear whether this extension is compliant with EU law. See Koerver Schmidt (2014). 
36 See Evers et al. (2015). Additionally, Italy introduced an IP box in 2015. See Valdonio/Tenore (2015).  
37 See for a recent discussion Mang (2015). 
38 See Evers et al. (2015). 
39 See Table 2.2 in the annex.  
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50% lower than the normal rates. Cyprus, Liechtenstein and Malta offer very low IP box 
rates that only amount to 2.5% and 0% respectively.40 
3. Model and Procedure 
In this section, we present the Devereux-Griffith methodology and the inclusion of CFC 
rules and IP boxes into the model. The results enable us to analyse the impact of the 
ECJ’s Cadbury-Schweppes decision on tax neutrality.  
3.1. The Devereux-Griffith Model 
The Devereux-Griffith model is a so-called forward-looking approach which computes 
the effective tax burden on both a hypothetical marginal and a highly profitable 
investment project of a company. For marginal investments, the effective marginal tax 
rate (EMTR) is computed whereas for profitable investments, the effective average tax 
rate (EATR) is derived. In this paper, we focus on profitable investments when 
modelling the acquisition of a patent since this allows us to analyse how taxes influence 
discrete location decisions.41 When computing the EATR, the most important regulations 
of the national tax regimes are taken into account. This includes nominal corporation tax 
rates and surcharges as well as regional taxes on profits. In addition, we consider the 
depreciation rules of patents for tax purposes. We assume a uniform pre-tax return of 
20% for our calculations.42 To study IP box regimes, the baseline model has to be slightly 
adapted by implementing the reduced IP box rate and the method to deduct expenses 
(i.e. gross or net income approach).43 Besides domestic investment, the Devereux-
Griffith model can simulate cross-border investments as well. When carrying out these 
simulations we take withholding taxes on profit repatriation in the source country and 
the method for avoiding international double taxation in the investor’s home country 
into account.   
40 Detailed properties of the IP box regimes can be found in Table 2.2 in the annex.
41Devereux/Griffith (1998, p. 337) and Devereux/Griffith (2003) also argue that the EATR is the relevant 
measure when analysing discrete location decisions. In empirical studies, researchers also focus on the 
EATR when focusing on FDI, e.g. Davies/Voget (2008).   
42 This is in line with previous studies. See p. ex. Spengel et al. (2014). 
43 See Evers et al. (2015) for more details on this.
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Figure 1: Devereux-Griffith Model 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the set-up of the model investment more precisely. The investment 
of the company takes place in a wholly owned subsidiary. The multinational aims at 
acquiring a patent from a third party in order to administer it and exploit it 
commercially. Practically, the acquisition of the patent can be conducted by the parent 
company or by any foreign subsidiary. Neglecting non-tax factors, the patent will be 
acquired in the country where the effective tax burden on (royalty) income is the 
lowest.44 We assume that the subsidiary receives (royalty) income from the exploitation 
of the acquired patent. This case unfolds a certain degree of economic activity as the 
administration and contract negotiations related to IP require skilled employees (as well 
as some office space and office equipment).45 In its judgement, the ECJ stated that only 
wholly artificial arrangements without any economic activity are allowed to trigger CFC 
rules. Conversely, this means that before the ruling, CFC rules also aimed at investments 
which constituted real economic activities like our assumed model investment. 
Egger/Wamser show empirically that CFC legislations can have a profound economic 
impact on companies’ real activity abroad.46 
In order to limit the complexity of our setting, the parent company finances the 
subsidiary solely by new equity.47 Thus, profits generated by the subsidiary are 
44 Exit taxation and transfer prices do not play a role since we model a transaction between third parties.
45 In fact, national tax laws of IP box countries also require investments to have some economic substance 
in order to qualify for the IP box provisions. Please also see Huibregtse et al. (2011). 
46 See Egger/Wamser (2012). 
47 We account for other financing possibilities (retained earnings, debt) in the robustness section. The 
parent company itself is refinanced by 100% new equity.   
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distributed to the parent company by means of dividend payments. For domestic 
investments, the EATR borne at the level of the subsidiary is assumed to be the overall 
tax burden since withholding taxes and taxes on repatriated profits (i.e. dividends) are 
zero in that case.48 However, profits earned from a cross-border investment may be 
taxed at two different levels. Firstly, the earnings of the investment are taxed at the level 
of the subsidiary. And secondly, the parent company might face an additional tax burden 
when profits are repatriated. With respect to the latter, we consider withholding taxes 
levied by the source country and the way the residence country taxes the repatriated 
profits (dividend income), i.e. how it avoids double taxation on foreign-source 
dividends.49 If the exemption method applies, the tax level of the source (foreign) 
country always prevails for the model investment. The corporate tax level in the 
residence country does not matter in that case.50 This gives multinationals incentives to 
take foreign countries’ taxes into account when deciding about an investment’s location. 
However, minimizing the tax burden of an investment by optimizing the location 
decision is restricted when CFC rules apply.51 In that case, taxes on the profits of a 
foreign subsidiary are calculated according to the tax law of the parent’s country. A relief 
mechanism for the tax paid in the foreign country may be granted in order to avoid 
double taxation. We consider the possibility that CFC rules apply in the following. 
3.2 Implementation of CFC rules 
The Devereux-Griffith model computes the EATR for both domestic and cross-border 
investments. The cross-border EATR accounts for the combined tax influence of the 
source country and the treatment of dividend income in the home country (e.g. 
exemption or credit method).  To determine whether the CFC rules of a residence 
country apply, the domestic tax burdens of the residence country and a source country 
are compared. CFC rules apply if the investment in the source country does not bear a 
sufficient level of tax burden from the residence country’s perspective. Formally, this is 
the case when the domestic EATR in the source country (𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑠
𝑑𝑜𝑚) is lower than the 
48 We disregard shareholder taxation since it does not affect decisions of corporations when assuming that 
there is significant international portfolio investment. Please also see Devereux/Pearson (1995, p. 1660).  
49 In the EU context at hand, double taxation is avoided by the provisions of the parent-subsidiary
directive which requires, firstly, the abolishment of withholding taxes and, secondly, the residence 
country to apply either the exemption or the credit method.
50 We do not take profit shifting possibilities by means of financing strategies in the main results into 
account. Financing strategies are considered in the robustness section.   
51 Griffith et al. (2014) also consider CFC rules when empirically analyzing the location decision of firms 
for intellectual property. 
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domestic EATR in the residence country (𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑟
𝑑𝑜𝑚) multiplied by a (residence) 
country-specific threshold. The relative threshold (𝑇𝐻𝑅𝑟) in the EEA lies between 50% 
and 75% and expresses by how much a source country’s tax level is tolerated to be 
lower than the residence country’s tax level. 
This condition can be written as:52 
𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑠
𝑑𝑜𝑚 >  𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑟
𝑑𝑜𝑚 ∗  𝑇𝐻𝑅𝑟 
If this condition is not fulfilled, CFC rules are triggered. This means that the domestic tax 
rules of the residence country are applied, i.e. the tax burden of the cross-border 
investment is computed as if it was a domestic investment in the residence country. In 
addition, the final tax burden in the CFC case is determined by the relief mechanism in 
the residence country for the (relatively little) taxes paid in the source country. In case 
of a tax credit, the tax burden will exactly equal 𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑟
𝑑𝑜𝑚 as the taxes paid in the source 
country are by definition always lower than in the home country and can therefore be 
fully credited. If no double taxation relief is granted, the tax burden equals the sum of 
𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑠
𝑑𝑜𝑚 and 𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑟
𝑑𝑜𝑚.53  
3.3 Analysis Procedure 
For a comprehensive analysis of the Cadbury Schweppes decision’s effect on the 
neutrality of investment decisions in the EU, we look at both member states’ 
adjustments to their CFC rules as demanded by the ECJ and the introduction of new low-
tax regimes (IP boxes) in some member states. As argued in section 1, the introduction 
of IP boxes for acquired patents has to be analysed in the context of the ECJ’s decision to 
restrict CFC rule since this impacts the effectiveness of the IP box regimes. 
In total, we distinguish four different scenarios which are inclined to allow conclusions 
on the ECJ’s effect on economic neutrality within the internal market: 
1. CFC–, IP–: CFC rules are not applicable and IP box regimes do not exist  
2. CFC+, IP–: CFC rules are in place and IP box regimes do not exist 
3. CFC–, IP+: CFC rules are not applicable and IP box regimes exist 
4. CFC+, IP+: CFC rules are in place and IP box regimes exist  
52 This is the condition for countries with relative thresholds. Germany, Greece and Hungary employ 
absolute thresholds as shown in Table 2.1 in the annex.  
53 This is the case in Hungary and Iceland. For the deduction method which is applied in Spain, the tax 
burden in the CFC case can be approximated by 𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑠
𝑑𝑜𝑚 +  𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑟
𝑑𝑜𝑚 −  𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑠
𝑑𝑜𝑚 ∗  𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑟
𝑑𝑜𝑚 .  
12 
To identify the situations which correspond most with an efficient allocation of 
resources as stipulated by the European treaties we rely on concepts that have been 
employed in previous studies.54 Pearson/Devereux analyse the impact of hypothetical 
corporate tax harmonisation reforms in the EU on production efficiency. Likewise, the 
European Commission examines economic inefficiencies induced by corporate taxes in 
the EU and simulates various hypothetical tax reforms. Elschner et al. evaluate how 
economic neutrality has changed over time in the EU. In principle, these studies analyse 
two issues: First, they investigate by how much domestic tax burdens differ from cross-
border tax burdens. Second, they show how much cross-border tax burdens vary 
depending on the source country in case of an outbound investment and the residence 
country in case of an inbound investment. With respect to outbound investments, a 
(parent) corporation can choose to invest in 30 different countries in our setting.55 In an 
idealized tax-efficient world, all outbound EATRs would be the same, i.e. the standard 
deviation of all investment location possibilities would be zero. Furthermore, the 
outbound EATRs would exactly equal the domestic EATR of the parent country. This 
would constitute an efficient allocation of resources across countries and so-called 
capital export neutrality (CEN) would be fulfilled. In this case, the pre-tax rates of return 
for the investment projects of the same investor are identical. Thus, no overall output 
increase can be achieved by reallocating capital from one country to another.  
In terms of inbound investments, there is an additional notion of efficiency, namely 
capital import neutrality (CIN). This concept ensures that different international 
investors in a specific country face the same after-tax rate of return for investments 
carried out in that country. Therefore, CIN ensures that domestic capital and inbound 
capital compete on an equal basis within a country. This is the case when all possible 30 
inbound investments into a country bear the same tax burden and when this tax burden 
equals that of domestic investors. Technically, the first condition is fulfilled if the EATR’s 
standard deviation for inbound investments equals zero.  
In our analysis, we will focus on both neutrality concepts – CIN and CEN. This approach 
corresponds to the aim of an optimal international tax structure in general and a level 
54 See e.g. Devereux/Pearson (1995); European Commission (2001); Elschner et al. (2011). 
55 We observe the 28 EU member states and the EEA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. 
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playing field in the EU in particular.56 The ECJ’s jurisprudence corresponds to these 
concepts as it aims at eliminating discriminatory measures for both outbound and 
inbound investments. However, due to the member states’ diverse reactions it is unclear 
if the rulings indeed lead to a more level playing field in the EU. 
4. Results 
In this section we present the results for the four different scenarios with respect to 
both domestic and cross-border EATRs for the years 2004, 2007, 2010 and 2014. These 
years reflect the situations before and after the ECJ’s judgement in 2006 as well as the 
increasing relevance of IP box regimes in recent years. 
4.1 CFC rules are not applicable and IP box regimes do not exist (Scenario 1) 
The first scenario serves as a baseline scenario which disregards CFC rules and IP box 
regimes. This allows quantifying and disentangling the influence of CFC rules and IP 
boxes later on. Furthermore, it reflects the analyses of previous studies which, however, 
look at more general investments. 
Table 1 shows the detailed results for all countries for the years 2004 and 2014. In most 
countries, the domestic EATR decreases from 2004 to 2014. This is in line with previous 
studies who find a declining trend in effective tax burdens in the EU.57 Overall, the 
(unweighted) average domestic EATR decreases from 25.57% in 2004 to 21.69% in 
2014. The standard deviation of domestic EATRs decreases from 8.03 in 2004 to 7.70 in 
2014 which indicates a slight convergence in national effective tax levels.  
For the cross-border investments, the results are presented in columns 3 to 6 of Table 1. 
The outbound columns (column 3 and 4) contain all possible outbound locations (i.e. 
subsidiaries) for a given residence country. This is attained by computing the average 
over all possible investment locations (30 countries) for a parent company. On the other 
hand, the inbound columns (column 5 and 6) contain all possible parent locations for a 
given investment location (i.e. subsidiary). More precisely, we compute the average 
inbound EATR over all the residence countries for a given source country for the years
56 We neither argue in favour of capital export neutrality (CEN) or capital import neutrality (CIN). For an 
evaluation of both CEN and CIN, see e.g. Musgrave (1969); Devereux/Pearson (1995); Desai/Hines Jr 
(2003); Desai/Hines Jr (2004). Our analysis rather exploits whether the ECJ ruling on CFC legislation has 
strengthened CEN or CIN. 
57 See Elschner et al. (2011); Endres et al. (2013). 
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Table 1: EATR for domestic and cross-border cases for 2004 and 2014 
EATR 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
(7) (8) (9) (10) 
   
Average 
 
EEA Standard Deviation 
Domestic 
 
Outbound Inbound 
 
Outbound Inbound 
2004 2014   2004 2014 2004 2014   2004 2014 2004 2014 
Austria 35.91 26.40 
 
25.81 21.53 38.28 28.02 
 
7.67 7.78 5.29 4.91 
Belgium 27.43 23.05 
 
28.15 23.13 30.17 23.96 
 
7.66 7.69 5.59 3.44 
Bulgaria 19.10 9.79 
 
31.32 22.08 30.58 11.00 
 
7.62 7.50 9.07 3.97 
Croatia 18.71 16.98 
 
30.58 22.40 28.03 18.91 
 
10.21 8.40 6.74 4.49 
Cyprus 15.84 11.69 
 
27.58 22.54 19.96 12.78 
 
8.22 8.94 7.52 3.89 
Czech 26.93 18.27 
 
26.54 21.89 30.12 19.74 
 
7.75 7.66 5.20 4.30 
Denmark 24.52 20.03 
 
26.39 21.74 26.67 21.02 
 
7.94 7.82 5.89 3.56 
Estonia 28.55 23.06 
 
48.60 40.15 29.55 23.41 
 
5.86 6.18 2.58 1.11 
Finland 30.63 21.12 
 
26.55 21.71 33.13 22.11 
 
7.69 7.83 5.59 3.52 
France 33.14 40.02 
 
29.27 26.97 35.22 40.64 
 
10.38 6.56 5.06 2.67 
Germany 36.81 28.94 
 
28.56 22.81 39.06 29.80 
 
7.85 7.59 4.98 3.21 
Greece 36.96 27.46 
 
35.84 22.23 37.77 29.06 
 
2.36 7.39 3.45 3.76 
Hungary 20.01 19.42 
 
26.94 21.76 25.22 20.43 
 
7.55 7.82 7.38 3.59 
Iceland 16.84 18.71 
 
31.81 23.25 26.20 20.10 
 
9.82 8.64 6.69 3.80 
Ireland 13.20 13.20 
 
29.13 22.06 18.94 15.08 
 
4.57 7.53 9.29 5.09 
Italy 32.74 21.87 
 
28.68 23.04 36.09 23.42 
 
7.76 7.71 6.56 4.48 
Latvia 14.03 14.03 
 
27.12 21.94 19.18 15.09 
 
7.45 7.69 7.58 3.80 
Liechtenstein 14.65 8.84 
 
38.53 26.53 23.43 12.49 
 
10.95 10.14 7.56 7.15 
Lithuania 12.73 12.73 
 
27.17 21.98 17.47 14.29 
 
7.37 7.64 7.95 4.56 
Luxembourg 28.42 27.33 
 
26.59 21.50 31.31 28.25 
 
7.79 7.76 5.45 3.27 
Malta 36.96 36.96 
 
35.79 21.18 37.77 37.77 
 
2.35 7.28 3.45 2.89 
Netherlands 32.27 23.38 
 
26.31 21.63 33.94 24.34 
 
7.96 7.82 4.99 3.43 
Norway 29.57 28.52 
 
28.53 22.39 33.69 29.82 
 
9.08 8.62 6.12 3.82 
Poland 17.77 17.77 
 
27.45 21.82 22.23 18.79 
 
6.36 7.79 6.83 3.65 
Portugal 29.04 31.68 
 
27.31 22.01 32.74 33.20 
 
7.55 7.33 6.43 4.60 
Romania 23.75 15.21 
 
31.45 21.90 32.09 16.26 
 
6.63 7.73 5.46 3.75 
Slovakia 17.77 20.58 
 
26.85 21.72 20.90 21.57 
 
7.57 7.83 6.44 3.54 
Slovenia 23.38 17.95 
 
27.56 22.70 27.61 19.41 
 
7.58 7.52 6.26 4.32 
Spain 38.98 34.79 
 
27.56 22.10 41.53 36.93 
 
8.42 7.42 4.60 4.89 
Sweden 24.22 20.29 
 
26.48 21.73 26.49 21.29 
 
7.89 7.82 4.91 3.55 
UK 31.68 22.18   31.83 21.67 32.92 23.15   3.07 7.83 3.88 3.48 
Mean 25.57 21.69 
 
29.62 22.97 29.62 22.97 
 
7.38 7.78 5.96 3.89 
Standard Deviation 8.03 7.70 
          
2004 and 2014. Analogously to the domestic results, the average outbound and inbound 
EATRs decline for the vast majority of countries from 2004 to 2014. This is also reflected 
in the mean figures over all countries (bottom row in Table 1): The mean of the average 
inbound and outbound EATRs decreases from 29.62% in 2004 to 22.97% in 2014. When 
relating this to national investments, the discrepancy in tax burdens between domestic 
and cross-border investments turns out to decline significantly to only 1.28 percentage 
points in 2014 compared to 4.05 percentage points in 2004. This indicates a move 
towards a more level playing field in the internal market which does not discriminate 
between domestic and cross-border investments. However, the average inbound and 
outbound EATRs of the single countries (column 3-6 in Table 1) as well as the means 
over these averages (bottom row of Table 1) mask substantial heterogeneity.  
The non-zero standard deviations for in- and outbound investments on a country level 
(column 7-10 in Table 1) indicate substantial differences of cross-border tax burdens 
depending on the location of the parent and the subsidiary. If CEN held, the standard 
deviation of outbound investments for a given residence country would be zero (column 
8 in Table 1 for the year 2014). Consequently, also the mean over these standard 
deviations should be zero (bottom row of Table 1). Analogously, if CIN held, the 
standard deviation of inbound investments for a given source country would be zero 
(column 10 in Table 1 for the year 2014). Clearly, CIN and CEN are not fulfilled in 2014 
given the non-zero standard deviations for cross-border investments. The mean 
standard deviation for outbound investments slightly increases from 7.38 in 2004 to 
7.78 in 2014 (bottom of column 7 and 8). At the same time, the average standard 
deviation for inbound investments significantly decreases from 5.96 to 3.89 (bottom of 
column 9 and 10). Taking both neutrality concepts into account, this constitutes a clear 
strengthening of CIN over time whereas economic distortions for outbound investments 
remain roughly constant.  
Overall, the domestic and cross-border figures can be explained by mainly two trends in 
national and international tax legislation in the EU. First, a general decline of the 
corporate income tax rates can be observed for almost all countries and especially for 
countries with initially high tax rates in 2004.58 This does not only lead to lower and 
converging domestic EATRs but also induces convergence in EATRs between domestic 
58 See Spengel et al. (2014, pp. A-1 - A-4) for a study on behalf of the European Commission.  
and cross-border investments. Second, the decline in cross-border EATRs can 
additionally be explained by some countries switching from the credit to the exemption 
method for taxing foreign dividend income. In recent years, all countries with credit 
systems have moved towards an exemption system except for Ireland.59 This also 
explains the steady decline over time of the inbound standard deviations because the 
cross-border tax burden is solely determined by the source countries’ tax level. 
However, domestic EATRs have increased in a few high-tax countries (e.g. France and 
Portugal) during and after the crisis due to their fiscal needs which explains why the 
mean of the standard deviations of outbound investments picks up again from 2010 to 
2014 (Table 2).60 This crisis development is also reflected in the mean of domestic 
EATRs which does not experience a further decline from 2010 to 2014. 
In the following, we consider how cross-border EATRs differ when implementing the 
other scenarios presented above. On the one hand, this is useful in order to identify and 
quantify the effects of specific features of the tax systems (e.g. a lower statutory tax rate 
on IP income). On the other hand, this serves to gather evidence on how helpful the ECJ’s 
Cadbury Schweppes decision was in moving closer to an internal market. We present the 
summarizing results of the different scenarios in Table 2 which shows the means of all 
countries corresponding to the bottom row of Table 1. 
4.2 CFC rules are in place and IP box regimes do not exist (Scenario 2) 
In this scenario, we assume CFC rules to be in place when computing the EATRs. This 
allows isolating the general impact of CFC rules on tax neutrality in Europe given the 
national tax systems in place. The qualitative analysis with regard to CFC rules in section 
2.1.3 shows that most of the countries enacted an exception clause as a reaction to the 
court’s ruling. Such an exception clause excludes all EU and EEA states from the CFC 
rules’ applicability in our investment setting. The scenario which we present now, 
however, neglects from the consequences of the judgement and assumes that CFC rules 
59 The last countries that changed their systems towards the exemption method were the United Kingdom 
in 2010 and Greece in 2011. See Spengel et al. (2014, p. A-23).  
60 Seven countries increased their corporate income tax rate from 2010 to 2014 which is a contrary 
development compared to previous years. See Spengel et al. (2014, p. A-1 - A-4).  
are still applicable in a European context after 2006.61 This sheds light on the potential 
relevance of CFC rules over time (given the real development of the domestic tax codes 
in the EU). Since the applicability of CFC rules depends on the relative difference 
between domestic and foreign tax levels, CFC rules are likely to play a smaller role in a 
situation with converging national tax levels.  
Table 2: Development of EATR for domestic and cross-border investments for 
different scenarios  
Year 𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑑𝑜𝑚̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅   𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  𝑆𝐷(𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑟,𝑠
𝑜𝑢𝑡)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑏̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  𝑆𝐷(𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑟,𝑠
𝑖𝑛𝑏)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   
   
 
  
Scenario 1:  CFC rules are not applicable and IP box regimes do not exist  
2004 25.57 29.62 7.38 29.62 5.96 
2007 23.13 25.79 7.58 25.79 5.25 
2010 22.00 23.58 7.45 23.58 4.16 
2014 21.69 22.97 7.78 22.97 3.89 
      
Scenario 2:  CFC rules are in place and IP box regimes do not exist 
2004 25.57 30.27 6.67 30.27 6.09 
2007 23.13 26.64 7.06 26.64 5.85 
2010 22.00 24.75 6.67 24.75 5.15 
2014 21.69 24.23 7.16 24.23 5.29 
      Scenario 3:  CFC rules are not applicable and IP box regimes exist 
2004 24.59 28.81 8.02 28.81 6.14 
2007 21.95 24.73 8.39 24.73 5.44 
2010 18.96 20.67 8.66 20.67 4.44 
2014 18.03 19.65 9.07 19.65 4.36 
 
     Scenario 4:  CFC rules are in place and IP box regimes exist  
2004 24.59 29.47 7.39 29.47 6.37 
2007 21.95 25.62 7.77 25.62 6.08 
2010 18.96 22.29 7.42 22.29 5.82 
2014 18.03 21.36 7.69 21.36 5.89 
Note: 𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑑𝑜𝑚̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ corresponds to the (unweighted) average over the 31 country-specific 𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑑𝑜𝑚. 
Each country faces 30 outbound and inbound possibilities. The two columns  𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  and  
𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑏̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ show the mean over all cross-border 𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑠 (31 x 30= 930). The two remaining co- 
lumns show the mean standard deviation over the 31 countries for outbound and inbound in-  
vestments. The data of scenario 1 for 2004 and 2014 corresponds to the last line of Table 1.  
61 Only CFC rules with a “threshold approach” (low taxation condition) will be regarded. Therefore, 
Finland, Hungary, Italy (2004-2009) and Sweden are excluded. Additionally, Spain is either not regarded 
as royalty income has not been defined as CFC income until 2015. Section 4.5 and Table 4.3 in the annex 
contain results for an extended scenario in which it is assumed that the CFC rules of these countries are 
also applicable.  
The results for scenario 2 are shown in Table 2. Clearly, the mean standard deviation of 
inbound investments (𝑆𝐷(𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑟,𝑠
𝑖𝑛𝑏)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) is higher when CFC rules apply compared to when 
they do not apply (scenario 1) and the difference is considerably increasing over time.62 
More precisely, the difference in the two standard deviations is increasing from 0.13 in 
2004 to 1.40 percentage points in 2014. This result is related to the general trend 
towards exemption systems which make the impact of CFC rules more pronounced. If 
CFC rules apply, the cross-border investment bears the same tax burden as the domestic 
investment in the residence country. Thus, from a source county’s perspective, inbound 
investments bear very different tax burdens depending on the residence country of the 
parent. This causes the mean standard deviation of inbound investments (𝑆𝐷(𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑟,𝑠
𝑖𝑛𝑏)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) 
to be high. Conversely, the mean standard deviation of outbound investments 
(𝑆𝐷(𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑟,𝑠
𝑜𝑢𝑡)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) decreases slightly when CFC rules are in place in all years. Taken 
together, CFC rules in the EU slightly strengthen CEN and clearly harm CIN. 
Furthermore, CFC rules lead to a further divergence between mean domestic tax levels 
(𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑑𝑜𝑚̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) and mean cross-border tax levels (𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  and 𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑏̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) in all years.63 
4.3 CFC rules are not applicable and IP box regimes exist (Scenario 3) 
In this scenario, we consider the emergence of IP box regimes in the EU. IP box regimes 
differ with respect to their scope of application as discussed in section 2.2. In our 
simulation, we focus on IP box regimes which include acquired patents in order to 
reflect our model investment into a patent. This scenario is of interest for at least two 
reasons: First, it reflects the real tax legislation for the years after 2006. Therefore, the 
scenario provides more accurate effective tax measures for IP investments than usually 
provided. Second, it enables us to assess the ECJ’s ruling and possible reform options 
when comparing it to the other scenarios. 
A priori, the effect of the IP box regimes on tax neutrality is ambiguous and not 
predictable. For example, France can be generally classified as a high tax country 
(applying a main corporate tax rate of 41.93% in 2014) which clearly deviates from the 
62 Table 4.1 in the annex contains a detailed overview on the number of countries for which CFC rules 
apply. 
63 However, these aggregated mean EATRs have to be interpreted cautiously. In case of outbound 
investments, the cross-border EATR for a given residence country rises if CFC rules apply. This application 
of CFC rules is good for CEN. However, it automatically increases the overall mean outbound EATR. The 
difference between EATRdom̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  (which is unaffected by CFC rules) and EATRout̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ increases although CEN has 
been strengthened.
mean EU tax level. The IP box tax rate of 21.34% (2014) puts France’s tax level more in 
line with EU standards. In contrast, Cyprus which generally represents a low tax 
jurisdiction (main corporate tax rate of 12.5% in 2014) further lowers its tax level to an 
IP box tax rate of 2.5%: This constitutes a move away from the mean EU tax level. 
Therefore, it is not clear whether the emergence of IP boxes in some countries leads to 
more or less neutrality in the internal market.  
The empirics in Table 2 show that the scenario at hand (CFC-/IP+) performs worse than 
the baseline scenario (CFC-/IP-) with respect to both CIN and CEN. The mean outbound 
standard deviation (𝑆𝐷(𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑟,𝑠
𝑜𝑢𝑡)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) is 1.29 percentage points and the mean inbound 
standard deviation (𝑆𝐷(𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑟,𝑠
𝑖𝑛𝑏)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) 0.47 percentage points higher in 2014 when 
considering IP boxes. This shows that the current IP box regimes do not foster 
convergence between member states’ tax levels but, in contrast, amplify differences in 
effective tax burdens. However, IP boxes lower the mean domestic EATR significantly to 
only 18.03% and the one of cross-border investments to 19.65%. 
4.4 CFC rules are in place and IP box regimes exist (Scenario 4) 
In this scenario we additionally assume CFC rules to be in place. Put differently, we 
model the hypothetical case of reintroducing CFC rules in today’s tax environment. From 
Scenario 3, we know that the emergence of IP box regimes is detrimental for CIN and 
CEN at least when there are no CFC rules in place. The results of the scenario at hand 
show that CFC rules are not the perfect solution to overcome the negative effects which 
IP boxes have on tax neutrality. The mean inbound standard deviation (𝑆𝐷(𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑟,𝑠
𝑖𝑛𝑏)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) is 
significantly higher (5.89 compared to 3.89) than in the baseline scenario (no IP boxes 
and no CFC rules). With respect to CEN, the reintroduction of CFC rules in 2014 would 
lower the mean outbound standard deviation (𝑆𝐷(𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑟,𝑠
𝑜𝑢𝑡)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) only very little compared 
to the baseline scenario – and not at all in the years 2004 and 2007.  
4.5 Robustness of results 
The results presented in the previous sections are based on specific assumptions about 
the applicability of CFC rules as well as on the pre-tax return and the financing of the 
investment in the Devereux-Griffith model. In the following, we will conduct different 
sensitivity analyses for these three dimensions and discuss whether our main results are 
still valid. 
In a first sensitivity analysis, we check how our results change when relaxing the 
assumptions for the application of CFC rules. So far we have taken a rather strict stance 
on the scope of applicability and excluded countries following a jurisdictional approach. 
Therefore, we have not considered the CFC rules of Finland, Hungary, Italy, Spain and 
Sweden in our calculations. Table 4.2 in the annex shows that our main results remain 
unchanged when the CFC rules of these countries are also considered. If more countries 
employ CFC rules the introduction of IP boxes led to a deterioration of CEN and CIN. The 
general effects of CFC rules are more pronounced if more countries employ CFC rules64 
and there is a tendency that CEN increases only modestly whereas CIN is significantly 
weakened.  
The EATRs calculated in the previous sections relied on the assumption that the 
investment yields a pre-tax return of 20%. EATRs are sensitive to changes in the pre-tax 
return and align with the statutory tax rate for very high pre-tax returns.65 For low pre-
tax returns, the determination of the tax base (tax depreciation rules) plays a more 
important role. Tables 4.4 and 4.5 in the annex show the results for pre-tax returns of 
15% and 25%. For a pre-tax return of 15% (25%), the EATRs are generally lower 
(higher) and the standard deviations for outbound and inbound investments are higher 
(lower) compared to a pre-tax return of 20%. Our main results are still valid as the 
introduction of IP boxes led to deterioration of CEN as well as CIN and a reintroduction 
of CFC rules cannot be recommended. 
As a third robustness check, the assumption that the subsidiary is entirely financed by 
new equity is relaxed. Additional financing possibilities might especially relevant for 
cross-border investments from low-tax residence to high-tax source countries. In these 
situations, financing the subsidiary in the high-tax country by debt is more beneficial 
compared to both new equity and retained earnings.66  For robustness, we produce 
results which only consider the most tax efficient source of financing. For this, we 
compute separate EATRs for each financing option in each of these cases. The most 
beneficial source of financing (i.e. the one with the lowest EATR) is chosen for each 
cross-border country pair. The results in Table 4.6 in the annex show that our main 
64 Table 4.3 in the annex contains a detailed overview concerning the number of CFC rules triggered by 
low taxation levels. 
65 See Devereux/Griffith (1999, p. 22); Schreiber et al. (2002, p. 16). 
66 It should be noted that an IP box in the residence country does not influence the financing decision as 
interest is always taxed at normal tax rates.
conclusions remain valid. However, the EATRs and the cross-border standard deviations 
are lower in all scenarios than in the baseline computations. This is due to the 
aforementioned beneficial debt financing of subsidiaries in high-tax countries. 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
Our paper demonstrates possible negative effects of the ECJ’s jurisprudence on the 
internal market by analysing the consequences of the Cadbury Schweppes decision. We 
use the well-known concepts of capital export and capital import neutrality to measure 
the impact of the judgement on international tax neutrality in Europe. The calculations 
with the Devereux-Griffith model enable us to disentangle specific features of the tax 
systems and assess their impact on the internal market. Interpretations should be drawn 
cautiously, though, since counterfactual scenarios are run in a ceteris paribus fashion.  
Without the ECJ Cadbury Schweppes decision, CFC rules would still be in place today 
and the emergence of IP boxes for acquired patents would have been discouraged. In 
this counterfactual scenario, we observe an improvement over time in capital import 
neutrality and only a very slight decrease in capital export neutrality.  
The real world scenario (de-facto abolishment of CFC rules and the emergence of IP 
boxes) can be seen as the aftermath of the Cadbury Schweppes decision in 2006. Our 
results do not show a clear dominance of this scenario in comparison to the 
prejudgement scenario. This dominance would be apparent in an improvement for both 
capital export and capital import neutrality. However, the judgement only fostered 
capital import neutrality. At the same time, the increasing divergence of domestic EATRs 
due to the IP box regimes and the non-applicability of CFC rules harmed capital export 
neutrality significantly. Therefore, our analysis casts doubt on the assumed positive 
effects of the ECJ’s jurisprudence on the internal market. Overall, further research is 
needed to relate and harmonise economic and legal concepts of tax neutrality. 
Given the current situation in Europe, it is worthwhile to discuss possible reform 
options and their possible impact on tax neutrality. Both reform options presented 
below are also currently discussed in the OECD BEPS project.  
First, CFC rules could be strengthened and de-facto reintroduced. A recently launched 
discussion draft by the OECD acknowledges the problems of reintroducing CFC rules in 
the EU due to the judgement of the ECJ.67 Nevertheless, the OECD argues that an 
extension of CFC rules’ applicability to domestic situations could ensure EU law 
compatibility.68 In our computations for this scenario (with CFC rules and with IP 
boxes), we observe an improvement for capital export neutrality but not for capital 
import neutrality. The desirability of this reform is therefore questionable. 
Second, IP boxes for acquired patents could be abolished. This is in line with the new 
nexus approach proposed by the OECD which would restrict the applicability of IP boxes 
to self-developed IP.69 Our results show very desirable properties for this scenario 
(without CFC rules and without IP boxes) as both capital export and import neutrality 
would be strengthened. Based on our results, we would therefore recommend the 
abolishment of IP boxes for acquired IP to achieve more tax neutrality in the internal 
market. 
67 See OECD (2015b, p. 10). 
68 Denmark follows this approach.
69 See OECD (2014, pp. 30-33) and OECD (2015a). 
Annex 
Table 2.1: CFC Rules in EU/EEA countries from 2004 to 2014 
Country Years 
Applicability of CFC Rules CFC Income and  Relief for Double Taxation 
Reaction to ECJ 
decision  
(year) Approach 
Definition of Low Taxation Unconditional 
Exclusion of 
EU/EEA-countries 
(apart from ECJ 
decision) 
Approach 
Taxation in Home 
Country 
Availability 
of Tax 
Credits 
Subsidiary 
Location 
Parent Location Threshold 
Denmark 2004-2006 Low Taxation actual tax paid 
hypothetical tax 
paid 
75% no 
Transactional (in-
cluding Royalties) 
Aggregation with 
Parent's Income 
yes   
  2007-2014 ---- 
   
no Entity 
Aggregation with 
Parent's Income 
yes 
Extension to 
national 
situations 
(2007) 
Finland 2004-2008 Jurisdictional (actual tax paid) 
(hypothetical tax 
paid) 
60% 
yes (tax treaty 
countries) 
Entity Separate Taxation yes   
  2009-2014 Jurisdictional (actual tax paid) 
(hypothetical tax 
paid) 
60% 
yes (no EU/EEA 
country on 
blacklist) 
Entity Separate Taxation yes 
EEA-clause    
(2009) 
France 2004-2005 Low Taxation actual tax paid 
hypothetical tax 
paid 
66.67% no Entity 
Aggregation with 
Parent's Income 
yes   
  2006-2014 Low Taxation actual tax paid 
hypothetical tax 
paid 
50% no Entity 
Aggregation with 
Parent's Income 
yes 
EEA-clause   
(2005) 
Germany 2004-2014 Low Taxation actual tax paid 
 
25%* no 
Transactional (in-
cluding Royalties) 
Aggregation with 
Parent's Income 
yes 
(limited)** 
EEA-clause    
(2008) 
Greece 2014 Low Taxation income tax rate 
 
13%* no Entity 
Aggregation with 
Parent's Income 
yes 
EEA-clause    
(2014) 
Country Years 
Applicability of CFC Rules CFC Income and  Relief for Double Taxation 
Reaction to ECJ 
decision  
(year) Approach 
Definition of Low Taxation Unconditional 
Exclusion of 
EU/EEA-countries 
(apart from ECJ 
decision) 
Approach 
Taxation in Home 
Country 
Availability 
of Tax 
Credits 
Subsidiary 
Location 
Parent Location Threshold 
Hungary 2004-2010 Jurisdictional (actual tax paid) 
 
10.67%* 
yes (tax treaty 
countries) 
Entity 
Inclusion when 
Dividends out of 
CFC Income are paid 
no 
EEA-clause    
(2008) 
  2011-2014 Jurisdictional (actual tax paid) 
 
10%* 
yes (tax treaty 
countries) 
Entity 
Inclusion when 
Dividends out of 
CFC Income are paid 
no   
Iceland 2010-2014 Low Taxation actual tax paid 
hypothetical tax 
paid 
66.67% no Entity 
Aggregation with 
Parent's Income 
no 
EEA-clause    
(2010) 
Italy 2004-2009 Jurisdictional 
   
yes (only very 
specific EU 
situations in 
blacklist) 
Entity 
Separate taxation 
(at least 27%) 
yes   
  2010-2014 Low Taxation actual tax paid 
hypothetical tax 
paid 
50% no Entity 
Separate taxation 
(at least 27%) 
yes 
EEA-clause    
(2010) 
Norway 2004-2014 Low Taxation actual tax paid 
hypothetical tax 
paid 
66.67% no Entity Separate taxation yes 
EEA-clause    
(2007) 
Portugal 2004-2014 Low Taxation actual tax paid 
hypothetical tax 
paid 
60% no Entity 
Aggregation with 
Parent's Income 
yes 
EEA-clause    
(2012) 
Spain 2004-2014 Low Taxation actual tax paid 
hypothetical tax 
paid 
75% no Transactional*** 
Aggregation with 
Parent's Income 
no (tax is 
only 
deductible) 
General 
Exemption 
(2003); EEA-
clause (2008) 
Country Years 
Applicability of CFC Rules CFC Income and  Relief for Double Taxation 
Reaction to ECJ 
decision  
(year) Approach 
Definition of Low Taxation Unconditional 
Exclusion of 
EU/EEA-countries 
(apart from ECJ 
decision) 
Approach 
Taxation in Home 
Country 
Availability 
of Tax 
Credits 
Subsidiary 
Location 
Parent Location Threshold 
Sweden 2004-2014 Jurisdictional (actual tax paid) 
(hypothetical tax 
paid) 
(55%) 
yes (only very 
specific EU 
situations in 
blacklist) 
Entity 
Aggregation with 
Parent's Income 
yes 
EEA-clause    
(2008) 
United 
Kingdom 
2004-2012 Low Taxation actual tax paid 
hypothetical tax 
paid 
75% no Entity Separate taxation yes 
EEA-clause    
(2007) 
  
2013-2014 Low Taxation actual tax paid 
hypothetical tax 
paid 
75% no Transactional Separate taxation yes 
  
* Germany, Greece and Hungary have an absolute limitation in place.  
** The tax credit is restricted to the corporate income tax (local profit tax is excluded). 
*** Royalties are included from 2015 on. 
Information is mainly gathered from the “European Tax Handbooks” which are published every year by the International Bureau for Fiscal Documentation (IBFD). Additional information 
regarding CFC regimes has been collected from two special issues of the International Fiscal Association (IFA (2001) and IFA (2013)) and two publications from Deloitte (Deloitte (2012) 
and Deloitte (2014)).
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Table 2.2: IP boxes in EU/EEA countries for acquired IP from 2004 to 2014 
Country 
Date of 
implementation 
IP box rate    
in 2014       
(%) 
Main rate   
in 2014  
(%) 
Treatment of current 
expenses 
Cyprus 2012 2.5 12.5 Net income 
France 2000 21.34 38.93 Net income 
Hungary 2004 9.5 20.86 Gross income 
Liechtenstein 2011 2.5 12.5 Net income 
Luxembourg 2008 5.84 29.22 Net income 
Malta 2010 0 35 Not deductible 
Information on IP boxes is taken from Evers et al. (2015). The slight differences in 
the main rates can be explained by a different consideration of local taxes and 
surcharges. Our main rates are the same as reported in the publication of Spengel et 
al. (2014) conducted for the European Commission. 
 
 
Table 4.1: Number of countries for which CFC rules are applied without and 
with IP boxes from 2004 to 2014 (narrow CFC definition) 
Country 
Scenario 2 
 
Scenario 4 
No IP Boxes 
 
IP Boxes implemented 
2004 2007 2010 2014 
 
2004 2007 2010 2014 
Denmark 8 12 13 13 
 
9 13 16 15 
France 11 7 7 13 
 
1 1 3 6 
Germany 15 18 19 22 
 
16 19 22 25 
Greece - - - 4 
 
- - - 7 
Iceland - - 3 3 
 
- - 6 6 
Italy - - 5 2 
 
- - 8 6 
Norway 10 12 13 12 
 
12 13 16 15 
Portugal 11 13 16 22 
 
12 14 19 25 
UK 13 15 16 7 
 
14 16 19 10 
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Table 4.2: Results for extended application of CFC rules for financing by new 
equity 
Year 𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑑𝑜𝑚   𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑆𝐷(𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑟,𝑠
𝑜𝑢𝑡)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑏  𝑆𝐷(𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑟,𝑠
𝑖𝑛𝑏)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   
   
 
  
Scenario 2:  Extended CFC rules are in place and IP box regimes do not exist 
2004 25.57 31.13 6.51 31.13 7.07 
2007 23.13 27.67 6.89 27.67 7.00 
2010 22.00 25.60 6.56 25.60 6.29 
2014 21.69 24.99 7.10 24.99 6.53 
Scenario 4:  Extended CFC rules are in place and IP box regimes exist 
2004 24.59 30.46 7.10 30.46 7.38 
2007 21.95 26.76 7.48 26.76 7.32 
2010 18.96 23.36 7.15 23.36 7.09 
2014 18.03 22.37 7.40 22.37 7.26 
      Finland, Hungary, Italy (2004-2009) and Sweden (2004-2014) exclude EU/EEA-countries due to double 
tax treaties or the use of blacklists/whitelists. In this extended scenario, we abstract from these 
restrictions and assume that CFC rules are applicable in an EEA context. Additionally, royalties constitute 
CFC income in Spain from 2015 on. We assume in this extended scenario, that CFC rules have been 
applicable to royalty income since 2004. 
Table 4.3: Number of countries for which CFC rules are applied without and 
with IP boxes from 2004 to 2014 (broad CFC definition) 
Country 
Scenario 2 
 
Scenario 4 
No IP Boxes 
 
IP Boxes implemented 
2004 2007 2010 2014 
 
2004 2007 2010 2014 
Denmark 8 12 13 13 
 
9 13 16 15 
Finland 8 7 7 3 
 
9 9 11 6 
France 11 7 7 13 
 
1 1 3 6 
Germany 15 18 19 22 
 
16 19 22 25 
Greece - - - 4 
 
- - - 7 
Hungary 0 2 3 2 
 
0 2 5 5 
Iceland - - 3 3 
 
- - 6 6 
Italy 5 7 5 2 
 
6 9 8 6 
Norway 10 12 13 12 
 
12 13 16 15 
Portugal 11 13 16 22 
 
12 14 19 25 
Spain 20 22 20 22 
 
21 23 23 25 
Sweden 2 4 5 2 
 
3 5 8 6 
UK 13 15 16 7 
 
14 16 19 10 
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Table 4.4: Results for financing by new equity (pre-tax return: 15%)  
Year 𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑑𝑜𝑚   𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑆𝐷(𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑟,𝑠
𝑜𝑢𝑡)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑏  𝑆𝐷(𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑟,𝑠
𝑖𝑛𝑏)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   
   
 
  
Scenario 1:  CFC rules are not applicable and IP box regimes do not exist  
2004 25.32 29.54 7.56 29.54 6.21 
2007 22.79 25.55 7.80 25.55 5.47 
2010 21.63 23.28 7.74 23.28 4.34 
2014 21.29 22.62 8.00 22.62 4.05 
Scenario 2:  CFC rules are in place and IP box regimes do not exist 
2004 25.32 30.17 6.86 30.17 6.32 
2007 22.79 26.46 7.21 26.46 6.08 
2010 21.63 24.52 6.93 24.52 5.39 
2014 21.29 23.99 7.34 23.99 5.59 
Scenario 3:  CFC rules are not applicable and IP box regimes exist 
2004 24.29 28.68 8.29 28.68 6.39 
2007 21.53 24.43 8.81 24.43 5.67 
2010 18.52 20.30 9.01 20.30 4.62 
2014 17.60 19.28 9.32 19.28 4.53 
Scenario 4:  CFC rules are in place and IP box regimes exist  
2004 24.29 29.35 7.65 29.35 6.62 
2007 21.53 25.39 8.07 25.39 6.35 
2010 18.52 21.98 7.74 21.98 6.07 
2014 17.60 21.05 7.95 21.05 6.13 
Note: 𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑑𝑜𝑚̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ corresponds to the (unweighted) average over the 31 country-specific 𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑑𝑜𝑚. 
Each country faces 30 outbound and inbound possibilities. The two columns  𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  and  
𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑏̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ show the mean over all cross-border 𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑠 (31 x 30= 930). The two remaining co- 
lumns show the mean standard deviation over the 31 countries for outbound and inbound in-  
vestments.   
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Table 4.5: Results for financing by new equity (pre-tax return: 25%)  
Year 𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑑𝑜𝑚   𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑆𝐷(𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑟,𝑠
𝑜𝑢𝑡)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑏  𝑆𝐷(𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑟,𝑠
𝑖𝑛𝑏)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   
   
 
  
Scenario 1:  CFC rules are not applicable and IP box regimes do not exist  
2004 25.71 29.67 7.31 29.67 5.81 
2007 23.34 25.93 7.51 25.93 5.12 
2010 22.22 23.76 7.34 23.76 4.06 
2014 21.93 23.18 7.70 23.18 3.79 
Scenario 2:  CFC rules are in place and IP box regimes do not exist 
2004 25.71 30.32 6.61 30.32 5.95 
2007 23.34 26.76 7.03 26.76 5.72 
2010 22.22 24.90 6.57 24.90 5.02 
2014 21.93 24.39 7.11 24.39 5.18 
Scenario 3:  CFC rules are not applicable and IP box regimes exist 
2004 24.78 28.89 7.89 28.89 5.98 
2007 22.20 24.91 8.20 24.91 5.31 
2010 19.22 20.90 8.50 20.90 4.34 
2014 18.29 19.87 8.98 19.87 4.26 
Scenario 4:  CFC rules are in place and IP box regimes exist  
2004 24.78 29.55 7.27 29.55 6.21 
2007 22.20 25.77 7.63 25.77 5.94 
2010 19.22 22.48 7.28 22.48 5.69 
2014 18.29 21.54 7.64 21.54 5.76 
Note: 𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑑𝑜𝑚̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ corresponds to the (unweighted) average over the 31 country-specific 𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑑𝑜𝑚. 
Each country faces 30 outbound and inbound possibilities. The two columns  𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  and  
𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑏̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ show the mean over all cross-border 𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑠 (31 x 30= 930). The two remaining co- 
lumns show the mean standard deviation over the 31 countries for outbound and inbound in-  
vestments.   
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Table 4.6: Results for most beneficial financing of subsidiary (new equity, 
retained earnings or debt)  
Year 𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑑𝑜𝑚   𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑆𝐷(𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑟,𝑠
𝑜𝑢𝑡)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑏  𝑆𝐷(𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑟,𝑠
𝑖𝑛𝑏)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   
   
 
  
Scenario 1:  CFC rules are not applicable and IP box regimes do not exist  
2004 25.57 26.70 6.50 26.70 4.52 
2007 23.13 23.44 6.51 23.44 3.97 
2010 22.00 21.67 6.43 21.67 3.39 
2014 21.69 21.21 6.52 21.21 3.25 
Scenario 2:  CFC rules are in place and IP box regimes do not exist 
2004 25.57 27.50 5.91 27.50 5.05 
2007 23.13 24.42 6.02 24.42 5.06 
2010 22.00 22.89 5.73 22.89 4.70 
2014 21.69 22.52 5.93 22.52 5.03 
Scenario 3:  CFC rules are not applicable and IP box regimes exist 
2004 24.59 25.93 7.17 25.93 4.64 
2007 21.95 22.46 7.42 22.46 4.10 
2010 18.96 19.07 7.84 19.07 3.55 
2014 18.03 18.23 8.21 18.23 3.54 
Scenario 4:  CFC rules are in place and IP box regimes exist  
2004 24.59 29.47 7.39 29.47 6.37 
2007 21.95 25.62 7.77 25.62 6.08 
2010 18.96 22.29 7.42 22.29 5.82 
2014 18.03 21.36 7.69 21.36 5.89 
Note: 𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑑𝑜𝑚̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ corresponds to the (unweighted) average over the 31 country-specific 𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑑𝑜𝑚. 
Each country faces 30 outbound and inbound possibilities. The two columns  𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  and  
𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑏̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ show the mean over all cross-border 𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑠 (31 x 30= 930). The two remaining co- 
lumns show the mean standard deviation over the 31 countries for outbound and inbound in-  
vestments.
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